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ARTFUL PLEADING DEFEATS HISTORIC  
COMMITMENT TO AMERICAN INDIANS  
 
Bethany Henneman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The United States government has specific commitments to 
federally recognized American Indian tribes through treaties, 
Congressional Acts, Executive Orders, and Executive Agreements as 
well as judicially created commitments.
1
 One such commitment is the 
Department of the Interior’s responsibility to hold American Indian 
lands in trust for the benefit of tribes.
2
 This responsibility requires the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the primary federal agency charged with 
carrying out the United States’ trust responsibility to American Indian 
people, to manage trust land in a way that best serves American Indian 
interests.
3
  
 
 In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak,
4
 the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted the Quiet Title 
Act (“QTA”)5 in such a way so as to significantly hinder the Secretary 
of the Interior’s (“Secretary”) responsibility to carry out the fee-to-
trust process for American Indian tribes. In Patchak, the Supreme 
Court considered: (1) whether the QTA’s reservation of immunity for 
actions respecting Indian Trust Lands barred Patchak’s suit and (2) 
whether Patchak’s economic, environmental, and aesthetic interests 
                                           
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; 
B.A., University of California, Berkeley. The author is grateful to her parents, Al and 
Suzie Henneman, and her brother, Brooks Henneman, for their unwavering support 
and encouragement. 
1
 Indian Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm 
(last updated Mar. 12, 2014, 5:23 PM). “Congress ended treaty–making with Indian 
tribes in 1871.” Id.  
2
 Holt v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 364 F.2d 38, 41 (8th Cir. 1966) (“Tribal land 
is held in trust by the United States for the use of the tribe. No individual Indian has 
title or an enforceable right in tribal property.”).  
3
 Indian Affairs, supra note 1.  
4
 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012). 
5
 28 U.S.C.A. § 2409a (West 1986) [hereinafter QTA].  
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were sufficiently within section 465 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act’s6 zone of interests as necessary to establish prudential standing.7  
 
 The Court found that the QTA’s “Indian Lands Exception”8 
barred the type of grievance Patchak advanced and concluded that the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s general waiver of sovereign immunity 
applied to Patchak’s suit.9 In addition, the Court found that Patchak 
had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary’s acquisition of the 
Bradley property because Patchak’s land use interests were within the 
Indian Reorganization Act’s zone of interests.10 
 
 The Supreme Court incorrectly focused on the nature of 
Patchak’s action in its determination that the QTA’s Indian Lands 
Exception did not apply.
11
 However, the test for whether the United 
States waives sovereign immunity under the QTA should be based on 
the relief requested, an “effects test,” instead of the plaintiff’s 
grievance.
12
 In this case, Patchak asked the Court to strip the United 
States of title to the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indian’s property. 13  Under the effects test, the QTA 
would bar suits by claimants such as Patchak who are not technically 
asserting an adverse claim but who are seeking an equally harmful 
result through artful pleading to the fee-to-trust process for American 
Indian lands.
14
 This standard would be consistent with the QTA’s 
allowance of suits beyond routine quiet title actions
15
 and include 
those suits that are impliedly forbidden by the Indian Lands 
Exception.
16
 
                                           
6
 25 U.S.C.A. § 465 (West 1988).  
7
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2203. 
8
 28 U.S.C.A. § 2409(a) (West 1986). The Indian Lands Exception refers to the 
language “[t]his section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands.” Id.  
9
  Id. at 2208. 
10
 Id. at 2211. 
11
 Id. at 2201. 
12
 Id. at 2214–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
13
 Id. at 2204 (majority opinion). 
14
 Id. at 2215 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
15
 An action to quiet title is defined as “a proceeding to establish a plaintiff's title to 
land by compelling the adverse claimant to establish a claim or be forever estopped 
from asserting it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (9th ed. 2009). 
16
 Id. at 2216–17. 
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I. THE CASE 
 
 In 2001, the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band Of 
Pottawatomi Indians (“the Band”) petitioned the Department of the 
Interior to take the Bradley Property into trust, announcing a plan to 
construct and operate a casino on the property in an effort to promote 
economic self–sufficiency. 17  In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs announced that it would take the Bradley Property into trust 
for the Band pursuant to section Five of the Indian Reorganization Act 
(“Reorganization Act”).18 The Federal Register published the decision 
with a thirty-day review period before the Secretary of the Interior 
(“Secretary”) could carry out the transaction.19  
 
 On August 1, 2008, David Patchak filed suit under the 
Administrative Procedure Act alleging section 465 of the 
Reorganization Act did not authorize the Secretary to acquire property 
for the Band because the Band was not a federally recognized tribe 
when the Reorganization Act was enacted in 1932.
20
 Patchak 
requested both a declaration that the decision to acquire the Bradley 
Property violated the Reorganization Act and an injunction to stop the 
                                           
17
 Patchak v. Salazar, 646 F.Supp.2d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir. 2009). The Band owned the 
land consisting of 147 acres in rural Wayland Township, Michigan. Patchak v. 
Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Band petitioned the Department of 
the Interior to take the Bradley Property into trust because “if gaming is to occur on 
off–reservation lands[,] those lands must be trust lands ‘over which an Indian tribe 
exercises governmental power.’” Memorandum from Carl Artman, Assistant Sec’y 
U.S. Dep’t of Indian Affairs to the Reg’l Dirs. of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
George Skibine (Jan. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.indianz.com/docs/bia/artman010308.pdf. 
18
 Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 74. See § 5 of the IRA, which provides: “‘[t]he 
Secretary of the Interior is authorized . . . to acquire, through purchase, 
relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands . . . within or 
without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments . . . 
for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C.A. § 465 (West 1988). 
19
 Patchak, 632 F.3d at 703. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(b) (2014). During the thirty-day 
period, an anti-gambling non-profit organization, MichGo, filed a lawsuit alleging 
that the Interior’s approval of the casino violated the National Environmental 
Protection Act and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 
75. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the court of 
appeals affirmed. Id. 
20
 Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 75. The Band intervened in the suit to defend the 
Secretary’s decision. Patchak, 632 F.3d at 704. 
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Secretary from accepting title.
21
 On October 6, 2008, both the Band 
and the United States filed Rule 12 motions seeking judgment in their 
favor on the grounds that Patchak lacked prudential standing.
22
  
 
 The district court held Patchak lacked prudential standing to 
challenge the Secretary’s acquisition of the Bradley property because 
Patchak’s interests did not fall within the zone of interests protected or 
regulated by section 465 of the Reorganization Act.
23
  The district 
court reasoned that Patchak’s requested remedy was likely to frustrate 
the objectives of the Reorganization Act, which are to enable self-
determination, self-government, and self-sufficiency.
 24
 As a result, the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and granted the 
United States motion to dismiss and the Band’s motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.
25
   
 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and held that 
Patchak had prudential standing to bring his claim against the 
Secretary.
26
 The court found the interests of those in the community 
surrounding the proposed casino, who would suffer from living near 
the proposed casino, were arguably protected interests for parties 
attempting to enforce Reorganization Act restrictions.
27
 After 
                                           
21
 Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 76. In January 2009, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari for Michigan Gambling Operation v. Kempthorne, 129 S. Ct. 1002 (2009), 
and the Secretary of the Interior took the Bradley Property into trust, mooting 
Patchak’s request for an injunction and making the suits sole purpose to divest the 
Federal Government of title to the Bradley Property. Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish 
Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (2012). 
22
 Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 76. To establish standing, Patchak contended that he 
lived in close proximity to the Bradley Property, and that a casino there would 
destroy the lifestyle he enjoyed by causing increased traffic, increased crime, 
decreased property values, an irreversible change in the rural character of the area, 
and other aesthetic, socioeconomic, and environmental problems. Patchak, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2203. 
23
 Patchak, 646 F.Supp.2d at 76. 
24
 Id. at 77. 
25
 Id. at 78. 
26
 Patchak v. Salazar, 632 F.3d 702, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
27
 Id. at 706. The Supreme Court introduced the zone of interests test in recognition 
of the “trend . . . toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest 
administrative action.” Id. at 705. The zone of interests analysis focuses on “who in 
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addressing the standing issue, the court turned to the question of 
whether the government consented to Patchak’s suit.28 The court held 
Patchak’s claim fell “within the general waiver of sovereign immunity 
set forth in section 702 of the APA.”29 The court found that the QTA 
did not cover Patchak’s suit because Patchak was not claiming an 
ownership interest in the Bradley Property.
30
 The D.C. Circuit Court’s 
holding conflicted with three other United States Circuit Court 
decisions, which held that the United States retained immunity from 
suits similar to Patchak’s. 31  This circuit split prompted the United 
States Supreme Court to grant certiorari to decide the two questions 
arising from Patchak’s action: (1) whether the United States had 
sovereign immunity from Patchak’s suit by virtue of the QTA, and (2) 
whether Patchak had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary’s 
acquisition.
32
 
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
   
In 2012, the QTA underwent a transformation in which the 
United States Supreme Court imposed a substantial burden on the 
government by opening it up to lawsuits which both Congress and the 
Executive Branch thought to be immune from challenge due to the 
“national public interest.” 33  Part II.A of this note discusses how 
historically, claimants asserting title to land held by the United States 
had only limited means of obtaining resolutions for title disputes.
34
 
Part II.B examines the enactment of the QTA, and specifically how 
Congress sought to rectify the difficulty plaintiffs experienced in title 
disputes against the United States.
35
 Part II.B.1 through Part II.B.2 
discuss how the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity was 
strictly construed by the Supreme Court, preventing plaintiffs from 
                                                                                                   
practice can be expected to police the interests the statute protects,” not “who 
Congress intended to benefit.” Id. 
28
 Id. at 707. 
29
 Id. at 712 [hereinafter APA]. 
30
 Id. at 709. 
31
 Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. 
Ct. 2199, 2204 (2012). 
32
 Id. at 2203. 
33
 Id. at 2218 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
34
 Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 
(1983). 
35
 Id. at 282. 
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avoiding the carefully crafted provisions of the QTA through artful 
pleading. Part II.B.3 completes the background analysis by examining 
the creation of the effects test used by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to further interpret the government’s waiver of sovereign 
immunity—by allowing suits to be characterized as quiet title actions 
based on the relief sought by plaintiffs. 
 
A. Prior to 1972, States and All Others Asserting Title to Land 
Claimed by the United States had Limited Means of Obtaining 
Resolutions 
 
 Without an express congressional waiver, the states and all 
other entities are barred from suing the United States by federal 
sovereign immunity.
36
 Prior to the passage of the QTA in 1972, the 
United States retained sovereign immunity with respect to suits 
involving title to land.
37
 The result of sovereign immunity was that any 
party seeking to assert title to land already claimed by the United 
States was left with limited means of enforcing their right; claimants 
could attempt to induce the United States to file a quiet title action 
against them, or, they could petition Congress or the Executive for 
discretionary relief.
38
 Claimants also attempted a third means of 
asserting their right: by initiating suits against federal officers as a 
method of obtaining relief in a title dispute with the federal 
government.
39
  
 
However, in Malone v. Bowdoin,
40
 the Supreme Court 
announced a rule regarding officer suits stating,  
 
the action of a federal officer affecting property claimed by a 
plaintiff can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief 
against the officer as an individual only if the officer's action is 
“not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within those 
                                           
36
 Id. at 280 (citing California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59 (1979)). 
37
 Id.  
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 281.3 
40
 369 U.S. 643 (1962). 
Henneman 7/21/2014  2:46 PM 
150  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 14:1 
 
 
 
powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular 
case, are constitutionally void.”41  
 
As a result of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Malone, 
plaintiffs were left with little recourse to assert and resolve title 
disputes with the federal government.
42
  
 
B. The QTA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Allows Citizens to 
Effectively Seek Recourse from the Courts 
 
 Subject to certain exceptions, the QTA waives the United 
States’ sovereign immunity and permits plaintiffs to name the United 
States as a party defendant in civil actions to adjudicate title disputes 
involving real property in which the United States claims an interest.
43
 
By passing the QTA, Congress sought to rectify the difficulty 
plaintiffs had long experienced when employing a suit to resolve a title 
dispute with the United States.
44
  The original version of the QTA 
stated “[t]he United States may be named a party in any civil action 
brought by any person to quiet title to lands claimed by the United 
States.”45 The Executive Branch opposed the original Senate Bill and 
proposed several limits on the waiver of sovereign immunity for the 
protection of the public interest.
46
 One of those limits excluded Indian 
lands from the scope of the waiver. The Executive branch argued that 
a waiver of immunity with regards to American Indian lands was 
inconsistent with existing commitments the government made to the 
Indians through treaties and other agreements.
47
 The final version of 
the bill included many of the exceptions proposed by the Executive 
Branch, including the Indian Lands Exception. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
41
 Id. at 647 (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702 
(1949)).  
42
 Block, 461 U.S. at 282. 
43
 Id. at 275–76. 
44
 Id. at 282. 
45
 Id.  
46
 Block, 461 U.S. at 282–83. 
47
 Id. at 283. 
Henneman 7/21/2014  2:46 PM 
2014]   ARTFUL PLEADING DEFEATS HISTORIC COMMITMENT 151 
 
 
1. Early Interpretations of the QTA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity  
 
 Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands
48
 
illustrates the Supreme Court’s early construal of the QTA with 
regards to the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. In Block, 
the issue before the court was whether Congress intended the QTA to 
provide the exclusive procedure by which a claimant could judicially 
challenge a United States’ title claim to real property.49 North Dakota 
asserted that even if suit was barred by section 2409a(f) of the QTA, 
North Dakota’s suit against the federal officers was maintainable 
independent of the QTA.
50
 The Supreme Court held that Congress 
intended the QTA to provide the exclusive means by which adverse 
claimants could challenge the United States' title to real property.
51
 
Block applied the rule of statutory construction that a precisely drawn, 
detailed statute preempts more general remedies.
52
  
 
 In State of Florida, Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. United States 
Dep't of Interior,
53
 the Eleventh Circuit also strictly construed the 
QTA to conclude that Congress’ decision to exempt Indian lands from 
the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity impliedly forbid the 
relief sought by plaintiffs, although technically the plaintiff’s suit was 
not a quiet title action.
54
 The court articulated Congress’ purpose in 
enacting the QTA, “to prohibit third parties from interfering with the 
responsibility of the United States to hold lands in trust for Indian 
Tribes.”55 Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be anomalous to 
allow other claimants, whose interests might be less than that of an 
adverse claimant, to divest the government’s title to Indian trust land.56 
 
 
                                           
48
 461 U.S. 273 (1983). 
49
 Id. at 276–77. 
50
 Id. at 280. 
51
 Id. at 286. 
52
 Id. at 285. “[Section] 702 provides no authority to grant relief when Congress has 
dealt in particularity with a claim and has intended a specified remedy to be the 
exclusive remedy.” Id. at 286 n.22. 
53
 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985). 
54
 Id. at 1254. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. at 1254–55.  
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2. Court’s Ensure Plaintiffs are Unable to Avoid the QTA by 
Characterizing Suits Under a Different Guise 
 
 In United States v. Mottaz,
57
 an action was brought to 
challenge the government’s sale of three Indian allotments to the 
United States Forest Service.
58
 Plaintiffs sought to avoid the carefully 
crafted limitations of the QTA by characterizing their suit as a claim 
for allotment under the General Allotment Act of 1887.
59
 Applying 
Block, the Court concluded that plaintiffs could not use section 345 of 
the General Allotment Act for a quiet title action against the 
government.
60
  
 
 The Court found that if plaintiffs were permitted to sue under 
the General Allotment Act, they might be entitled to actual possession 
of the challenged property.
61
 Thus, the Court reasoned, permitting 
suits against the United States under the General Allotment Act would 
allow plaintiffs to avoid the QTA’s twelve–year statute of limitations 
and seriously disrupt ongoing federal programs, precisely the threat 
the QTA was enacted to avoid.
62
 The Court explained that “[t]he 
limitations provision of the QTA reflects a clear congressional 
judgment that the national public interest requires barring stale 
challenges to United States’ claims to real property, whatever the 
merits of those challenges.”63  
                                           
57
 476 U.S. 834 (1986). 
58
 Id. at 836. Ancestors of respondent Florence Mottaz each received an 80 acre 
allotment on the Leech Lake Reservation and Mottaz inherited a one–fifth interest in 
one of the allotments and a one-thirtieth interest in each of the other two. Id. United 
States held in trust title to all three allotments. Id. 
59
 Id. at 844. Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, Congress imposed American 
real property and inheritance law upon American Indian territories, forcing the 
division of tribal land amongst the individual citizens of tribes to be held by the 
United States in trust for the individual allottee. G. William Rice, The Indian 
Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigeous Peoples, and a 
Proposed Carcieri Fix: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. 
REV. 575, 576 (2009). 
60
 Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 846. 
61
 Id. at 847. Plaintiff sought a declaration that she alone possessed valid title. Id. at 
842. The fact that the plaintiff in Mottaz claimed the right to elect a remedy that 
would not require the Government to relinquish its possession of the disputed lands 
was irrelevant to the Supreme Court. Id. at 847. 
62
 Id. at 847.  
63
 Id. at 851. 
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3. The Circuit Courts Create an Effects Test, Characterizing Suits as 
Quiet Title Actions Based on the Relief Sought by Plaintiffs 
 
 After United States v. Mottaz,
64
 it was evident that the QTA’s 
limitation on suits should not be circumvented through artful 
pleading.
65
 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, the circuit courts 
focused their attention on how a plaintiff’s suit would impact the 
United States’ title to Indian trust land rather than focusing on the type 
of property interest a plaintiff asserted in their complaint.
66
  
 
 In Metropolitan Water District of South California v. United 
States,
67
  the plaintiffs argued that the QTA did not apply to their suit 
because the Metropolitan Water District was not seeking to quiet title 
but instead seeking a determination of the boundaries of an Indian 
Reservation.
68
 However, the Ninth Circuit held in favor of the United 
States, stating that although plaintiffs sought a determination of the 
boundaries of the reservation, the effect of a successful challenge 
would be to quiet title in others than the Tribe.
69
 The court stated that 
to allow this suit would be to permit third parties to interfere with the 
government’s discharge of its responsibilities to Indian tribes with 
respect to the lands it holds in trust for them. The court concluded that 
third parties are not permitted to interfere when the Secretary claims 
an interest in real property based upon that property’s status as trust or 
restricted Indian land.
70
   
 
 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit used an effects test in 
Neighbors for Rationale Development, Inc. v. Norton.
71
 Neighbors 
argued that the QTA was inapplicable to its case because the plaintiffs 
                                           
64
 476 U.S. 834 (1986). 
65
 Neighbors for Rational Dev., Inc. v. Norton, 379 F.3d 956, 965 (2004), abrogated 
by Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. 
Ct. 2199 (2012). 
66
 Id. 
67
 830 F.2d 139 (1987), abrogated by Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012). 
68
 Metro. Water Dist. of S. California, 830 F.2d at 143. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at 144. 
71
 379 F.3d 956 (2004). 
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were not adverse claimants seeking to quiet title in the Indian school 
property and did not claim an ownership interest in the property.
72
 The 
court held that the QTA precluded Neighbor’s suit to the extent it 
sought to nullify the Secretary’s trust acquisition.73 The court stated 
“[i]t is well settled law that the QTA’s prohibition of suits challenging 
the United States’ title to Indian trust lands may prevent suit even 
when a plaintiff does not characterize its action as a quiet title 
action.”74 The court reasoned that if Congress was unwilling to allow a 
plaintiff claiming title to land to challenge the United States’ title to 
trust land, it was highly unlikely Congress intended to allow plaintiffs 
with no claimed property rights to challenge the same title to trust 
land.
75
  
 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
 In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the D.C. 
Circuit, holding that the QTA’s reservation of sovereign immunity did 
not bar Patchak’s suit nor did the doctrine of prudential standing.76 
The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.
77
 
 
 The Supreme Court’s first task involved determining whether 
the United States retained sovereign immunity from Patchak’s suit.78 
To get to this question, the Supreme Court first looked at section 702 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which generally waives 
the government’s sovereign immunity for claimants seeking “relief 
other than monetary damages” and stating “a claim that an agency or 
an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 
                                           
72
 Id. at 961. 
73
 Id. at 965. 
74
 Neighbors for Rationale Dev., Inc., 379 F.3d at 961. See also Martin M. Heit, 
Annotation, Real Property Quiet–Title Actions against United States under Quiet 
Title Act, 60 A.L.R. FED. 645 (1982) (“Quiet Title Act’s prohibition of suits 
challenging the United States’ title in Indian trust land may prevent suit even when a 
plaintiff does not characterize its action as a quiet title action.”). 
75
 Neighbors for Rationale Dev., Inc., 379 F.3d at 962. 
76
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2212. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 2203. 
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capacity or under color of legal authority.” 79  The Court’s opinion 
noted that the APA’s general waiver does not apply “if any other 
statute granting consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief 
which is sought.”80 Therefore, the Court considered both the Band and 
Secretary’s contention that the QTA expressly forbid the relief sought 
by Patchak.
81
  
 
The QTA includes its own waiver of sovereign immunity, 
which authorizes suits against the government to adjudicate disputed 
titles to real property in which the United States claims an interest.
82
 
However, the QTA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply “to 
trust or restricted Indian lands.”83 The Court, using language in a letter 
written by Justice Scalia during his time in the Office of the Attorney 
General,
84
 stated that the Indian Lands Exception did not render the 
government immune from suit because the QTA addresses only quiet 
title actions which were different than the grievance advanced by 
Patchak.
85
 According to the majority, the QTA speaks only to quiet 
title actions, which are “universally understood to refer to suits in 
which a plaintiff not only challenges someone else’s claim, but also 
asserts his own right to disputed property.”86 The Court ruled that the 
Indian Lands Exception did not apply because Patchak was not 
asserting his own claim to the land, and thus his suit was 
distinguishable from a quiet title action. In reaching its decision, the 
Court differentiated Patchak’s case from two prior cases where the 
QTA was used to address suits in which the plaintiff asserted an 
ownership interest in property held by the government.
87
 The court 
                                           
79
 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
80
 Id. 
81
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2205. 
82
 Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2006). 
83
 Id. 
84
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2205. 
85
 Id. Patchak did not claim any competing interest in the Bradley Property. Id. at 
2206. 
86
 Id. The Court strengthened its argument by noting that the other provisions of the 
QTA made clear that the term quiet title action carried its ordinary meaning under 
the statute. Id. 
87
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2208. 
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concluded that Patchak’s suit was a “garden variety” APA claim and 
that the APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity applied.88 
 
 Next, the Court considered the alternative argument that 
Patchak lacked prudential standing.
89
 The Band and Government 
argued that Patchak’s injuries were not within section 465’s zone of 
interests because the Reorganization Act focuses on land acquisition 
whereas Patchak’s interests were based on land use.90 The Court noted 
that land forms the basis for Tribal economic life and that section 465 
is the primary mechanism to foster the economic development of 
Indian Tribes.
91
 In turn, under section 465, the Secretary takes title to 
properties in trust if “the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self–
determination, economic development, or Indian housing.” 92  In the 
Court’s opinion, the Department of the Interior’s policy reflected the 
Reorganization Act’s dependence on the projected use of the 
property.
93
 Therefore, according to the Court, the decision to acquire 
the Bradley Property for gaming purposes under section 465 involved 
questions of land use.
94
 The Court concluded that Patchak’s economic, 
environmental, and aesthetic interests in land use fell within the zone 
of interests protected by the Reorganization Act.
95
  
 
 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority opinion 
was inconsistent with both the QTA and the APA.
96
 Justice Sotomayor 
reasoned that as a result of the opinion, any person could sue under the 
APA “to divest the Federal Government of title to and possession of 
land held in trust for Indian tribes, relief expressly forbidden by the 
QTA, so long as the complaint does not assert a personal interest in the 
land.”97  
                                           
88
 Id. at 2208. 
89
 Id. at 2210. The Court applied its prudential standing test: a person suing under the 
APA must satisfy Article III standing requirements and the interest asserted must be 
“arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated” by the IRA. Id. 
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. at 2211. 
92
 25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(3) (2013). 
93
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2211. 
94
 Id. at 2211–12. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. at 2212. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
97
 Id. 
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The dissent laid out Congress’ intent in enacting the QTA, 
which was to provide a comprehensive solution to the problem of 
real–property disputes between private parties and the United States.98 
Justice Sotomayor contended that the expansive provision in section 
2409(a) of the QTA was limited, through the Indian Lands Exception, 
because the application of a waiver of immunity in regards to trust or 
restricted Indian Lands would frustrate earlier commitments the 
government had made to Indian Tribes.
99
 Next, in regards to the QTA, 
she argued that the Indian Lands Exception was essential because it 
guaranteed that the United States could not be stripped of possession 
of property in trust for Indian Tribes without giving consent.
100
 
Finally, Justice Sotomayor asserted that Congress’ restriction on the 
class of claimants entitled to relief impliedly forbade relief for the 
remainder.
101
 Therefore, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the QTA 
expressly precluded the relief Patchak sought, to divest the Federal 
Government of title to Indian trust land.
102
 
 
 Turning to section 702 of the APA, which focuses on whether 
another statute explicitly or impliedly forbids the relief a claimant 
seeks, Justice Sotomayor concluded that the relief Patchak sought, to 
oust the Government of title to Indian trust land, was identical to the 
relief forbidden by the QTA.
103
 She noted that it was highly 
implausible that Congress intended to retain the government’s 
sovereign immunity against those asserting a constitutional real 
property interest while waiving the government’s sovereign immunity 
against those who assert an aesthetic interest in land use.
104
 
Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority by pointing out 
that the QTA allows suits beyond quiet title actions including suits by 
                                           
98
 Id. Justice Sotomayor quoted section 2409(a) of the QTA which reads, “[t]he 
United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section 
to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an 
interest.” Id. 
99
 Id. at 2213. 
100
 Id.  
101
 Id. In this case, judicial review of those without a “right, title, or interest” may be 
impliedly precluded because their interest is insufficient to warrant abrogation of the 
government’s sovereign immunity. Id. 
102
 Id. at 2214. 
103
 Id. at 2214–15. 
104
 Id. at 2215. 
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claimants with easements, mineral rights, or some other lesser “right” 
or “interest.”105 In addition, she noted, even if the QTA only expressly 
forbid quiet title actions, Patchak’s suit would still be impliedly 
forbidden.
106
  
 
 Finally, Justice Sotomayor identified three consequences 
derivative from the majority’s opinion which Congress could not have 
intended when it enacted the QTA: (1) the QTA’s limitations are 
easily circumvented; (2), the Government’s ability to resolve real-
property challenges expeditiously is frustrated; and (3), the creation of  
substantial uncertainty regarding which claimants are barred from 
bringing APA claims.
107
 Justice Sotomayor concluded that the 
government should have retained sovereign immunity from Patchak’s 
suit because the QTA’s Indian Lands Exception barred the relief 
Patchak sought.
108
 The dissenting opinion never reached the question 
of prudential standing. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
 In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak, the United States Supreme Court held that the Indian 
Lands Exception to the QTA did not address the type of grievance 
Patchak advanced because Patchak was not an adverse claimant.
109
 
Based on this determination, the Court concluded that the APA’s 
general waiver of sovereign immunity applied to Patchak’s suit.110 The 
Court’s focus on the nature of Patchak’s action—injuries related to the 
use of the Bradley Property as a casino
111—was an unlikely result in 
light of the Court’s earlier interpretations of the QTA in Block112 and 
                                           
105
 Id. at 2216. 
106
 Id. at 2216–17. 
107
 Id. at 2217. 
108
 Id. at 2218. 
109
 Id. at 2207.  
110
 Id. at 2210. 
111
 Id. at 2203. 
112
 See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 277 (1983) (holding “that the QTA 
forecloses the other bases for relief urged by the State, and that the limitations 
provision is as fully applicable to North Dakota as it is to all  
others who sue under the QTA”).   
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Mottaz.
113
 The Court’s holding allows plaintiffs to oust the 
government of title to Indian land through an APA action, nullifying 
the Indian Lands Exception to the QTA. Instead of focusing on the 
nature of Patchak’s action the Court should have focused on the effect 
of a successful challenge. This relief–focused approach would 
safeguard the United States’ sovereign immunity from suits like 
Patchak’s seeking to dispossess the government of Indian trust land. 
  
A. Allowing Patchak to Avoid the Carefully Crafted Provisions of the 
Quiet Title Act was an Improbable Result After Block and Mottaz 
 
 In Patchak, the Supreme Court strayed from its strict 
observance of the conditions Congress attached to the QTA as seen in 
Block and Mottaz, rendering futile the government’s time-honored 
commitment to tribal self–sufficiency. The Supreme Court permitted 
Patchak to circumvent the QTA’s Indian Lands Exception by filing an 
action under the APA because it found Patchak was not an adverse 
claimant.
114
 The determination that Patchak was not an adverse 
claimant was important to the principle of stare decisis because in 
Block the Supreme Court held that “Congress intended the QTA to 
provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could 
challenge the United States' title to real property.”115  
 
 The APA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity was not 
intended to be the new supplemental remedy for plaintiffs involved in 
land use disputes with the United States government.
116
 Enacted only 
four years after the QTA, the APA specifically withholds authority to 
grant relief if “any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or 
impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”117 The Court in Block 
recognized that if a plaintiff could use an APA action to divest the 
government of title to Indian trust land, “all of the carefully crafted 
                                           
113
 See United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 836 (1986) (holding “that 
respondent’s suit is an action ‘to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which 
the United States claims an interest’ within the meaning of the Quiet Title Act of 
1972”). 
114
 Id. at 2207. 
115
 Block, 461 U.S. at 286. 
116
 Id. at 286 n.22. 
117
 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). 
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provisions of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the 
national public interest could be averted … [and] the Indian lands 
exception to the QTA would be rendered nugatory.”118 Twenty–nine 
years later, the Court did just that, allowing Patchak to bring suit 
against the Secretary to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in 
which the United States claimed an interest. 
 
 Although the majority in Patchak did not specifically overturn 
the opinion of Block, the Patchak decision did not adequately 
distinguish the two cases. The grievance Patchak asserted was no 
different from the plaintiffs in Block who attempted to avoid the 
QTA’s restrictions by bringing an officer’s suit, seeking relief because 
agency officials acted outside of their federal power.
119
 Patchak 
similarly claimed that the Secretary lacked authority under section 465 
to take title to the Bradley property, but distinguished the suit from 
Block by claiming economic, environmental, and aesthetic harm would 
ensue from the casino's operation.
120
  
 
 However, in Block, the Court was not “detained long by North 
Dakota's contention that it [could] avoid the QTA's statute of 
limitations and other restrictions by the device of an officer's suit.”121 
The Court rejected the officer’s suit stating, “[i]t would require the 
suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its 
careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful 
pleading.”122  In contrast, the Patchak Court declined to follow the 
reasoning in Block, and instead narrowly defined adverse claimant as 
“plaintiffs who themselves assert a claim to property antagonistic to 
the Federal Government's.” 123  Essentially, the Supreme Court 
distinguished Patchak and North Dakota’s suits based on the 
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaints.124  
 
                                           
118
 Block, 461 U.S. at 284–85.  
119
 Id. at 278 n.3.  
120
 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish- Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 
2199, 2202–03 (2012). 
121
 Block, 461 U.S. at 284. 
122
 Id. at 285 (quoting Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976)). 
123
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2207. 
124
 Id. 
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 The Supreme Court inadequately distinguished the claims 
because both plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, directing the United 
States to cease and desist from exercising ownership over the land in 
question. As stated by the majority in Patchak, “[a]ll parties agree that 
the suit now effectively seeks to divest the Federal Government of title 
to the [Indian trust] land.” 125  This type of relief was specifically 
addressed in United States v. Mottaz as relief forbidden under the 
QTA; “[s]ection 2409a(a) …  [ ] operates solely to retain the United 
States’ immunity from suit by third parties challenging the United 
States’ title to land held in trust for Indians.” 126  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Patchak was an unlikely result of the 
decisions in Block and Mottaz. 
 
B. The Supreme Court Erred by Focusing on the  
Nature of Patchak’s Action 
 
 Patchak was able to circumvent the Indian Lands Exception 
through artful pleading, which is now likely to be the favored strategy 
for plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in 
which the United States claims an interest. In order to avoid the QTA, 
Patchak merely categorized his suit as aesthetic, a suit not to contend 
his ownership of the Bradley property, but instead to strip the United 
States of title to Indian trust land based on economic, environmental, 
and aesthetic harms.
127
 Allowing plaintiffs to use a garden variety 
APA claim to challenge a decision by the Secretary to take Indian land 
into trust adversely implicates the Indian Lands Exception by opening 
up the Courts to non–adverse claimants like Patchak, who have the 
most remote injuries and indirect interests in the land.
128
  
 
 The Supreme Court’s focus on the nature of Patchak’s action 
will open the floodgates to litigation based on a small misidentification 
of the QTA’s operative language. The Supreme Court incorrectly 
defined the QTA to authorize a particular type of action; “a suit by a 
plaintiff asserting a ‘right, title, or interest’ in real property that 
                                           
125
 Id. at 2204. 
126
 United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 842 (1986). 
127
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2207. 
128
 Id. at 2209. 
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conflicts with a ‘right, title, or interest’ the United States claims.”129 
However, that language comes from 28 U.S.C. section 2409a(d), 
which merely states the parameters for a complaint under the QTA.
130
  
 
 The Supreme Court should have focused on the QTA’s 
operative language in 28 U.S.C. section 2409a(a), which reads: “[t]he 
United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action 
under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in 
which the United States claims an interest . . . [t]his section does not 
apply to trust or restricted Indian lands.”131 Section 2409a(a) reflects 
Congress’s intent that the United States’ real property interest define a 
QTA action, not the plaintiff’s interest.  Based on the language of 
section 2409a(a), the United States should retain full immunity from 
suits seeking to challenge its title to Indian trust land. Patchak’s suit 
contests the government’s title to the Bradley property held in trust for 
the Band, and therefore, should have been barred by the government’s 
sovereign immunity with respect to Indian trust lands under the QTA.  
 
 The majority opinion will severely hinder the judicial system 
and the executive branch because until the Patchak decision, parties 
seeking to challenge agency action had only a thirty–day review 
period to seek judicial review.
132
 APA claims, however, generally 
have a six–year statute of limitations, which will hinder all American 
Indian Tribe’s ability to develop land until the APA’s six–year statute 
of limitations has lapsed.
133
 This result cannot be squared with the 
                                           
129
 Id. at 2205. This narrow definition essentially limits quiet title actions to “suits in 
which a plaintiff not only challenges someone else’s claim, but also asserts his own 
right to disputed property.” Id. at 2206. 
130
 See Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(d) (1986) (stating “[t]he complaint shall 
set forth with particularity the nature of the right, title, or interest which the plaintiff 
claims in the real property, the circumstances under which it was acquired, and the 
right, title, or interest claimed by the United States.”). 
131
 Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (1986). This clause has been interpreted to 
mean that “[w]hen the United States claims an interest in real property based on that 
property’s status as trust or restricted Indian lands, the Quiet Title Act does not 
waive the government's immunity.” 65 AM. JUR. 2D Quieting Title § 86 (2013). See 
also Martin M. Heit, , supra note 77, at 645 (“With regard to the Quiet Title Act 
Indian lands exception generally, as long as the United States has a colorable claim 
to a property interest based on that property's status as trust or restricted Indian 
lands, the QTA renders the government immune from suit.”). 
132
 25 C.F.R. § 151.12 (2011). 
133
 Patchak, 132 S. Ct. at 2217. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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Department of the Interior’s investment in the economic development 
of Tribes and will severely impede the Secretary from acquiring 
properties “for the purpose of providing land [to the] Indians.”134 
 
C. The Supreme Court Should Have Created a Relief–Centered 
Approach to Determine Whether an Action Falls Under the QTA 
 
 The proper test for whether the QTA applies is an effects test 
based on the relief requested by the plaintiff. Any suit seeking to 
divest the government of title to Indian trust land would be barred by 
the Indian Lands Exception to the QTA. This test would apply to suits 
for purposes other than to quiet title, prohibiting third parties from 
interfering with the responsibility of the United States to hold land in 
trust for Indian tribes. 
 
 An effects test was effective when applied in the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. In State of Florida, Dep't of Bus. Regulation 
v. United States Dep't of Interior, the Eleventh Circuit found 
Congress’ decision to exempt Indian lands from the waiver of 
sovereign immunity impliedly forbid the relief sought by the 
plaintiffs.
135
 Because the result of a successful suit would have 
interfered with the trust relationship between the Tribe and the 
government, the court lacked jurisdiction; the lawsuit was barred by 
United States sovereign immunity.
136
 
 
 The effects test, or relief–centered approach, is consistent with 
the solemn commitments between American Indian Tribes and the 
United States Government in regards to Indian trust lands. As stated in 
a Senate Report regarding the QTA;  
 
“[t]he Federal Government has over the years made specific 
commitments to the Indian people through written treaties and 
through informal and formal agreements. The Indians, for their 
part, have often surrendered claims to vast tracts of land. 
President Nixon has pledged his administration against 
                                           
134
 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1988). 
135
 768 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1985). 
136
 Id. at 1257. 
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abridging the historic relationship between the Federal 
Government and the Indians without the consent of the 
Indians.”137 
 
An effects test would effectively safeguard the historic relationship 
between the federal government and American Indians by keeping the 
government from being subject to burdensome, expensive litigation, 
potentially resulting in unjust loss of federal trust properties.
138
 
 
 This relief–centered approach is also consistent with the 
language of the APA. The APA's general waiver of the federal 
government's immunity from suit does not apply “if any other statute 
that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief 
which is sought” by the plaintiff.139 The APA focuses on the relief 
which is sought. This is consistent with the QTA, which focuses on 
suits where the relief sought by the plaintiff would challenge the 
United States interest in real property. In addition, using an effects test 
would allow for uniformity among similar suits. In Patchak, Block, 
and Mottaz, the effect of a successful challenge was to divest the 
United States of title to Indian trust land. Under the effects test, all 
three suits would be barred by United States sovereign immunity. In 
conclusion, the Supreme Court’s focus on the nature of Patchak’s 
action was incorrect; when a plaintiff’s suit has the effect of 
dispossessing the government of Indian trust land, the Indian Lands 
Exception to the QTA should apply.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak, Patchak’s artful characterization of his suit permitted the 
Court to strip the United States of title to the Bradley Property, relief 
expressly and impliedly forbidden by the QTA.
140
 The Supreme Court 
should have focused on the effect of a successful challenge to the 
Secretary of the Interior’s actions, which was to divest the federal 
government of title to Indian trust land.
141
 Instead, the Court allowed 
                                           
137
 S. REP. NO. 92–575, at 4 (1971). 
138
 Id. 
139
 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). 
140
 See supra Part IV.A. 
141
 See supra Part IV.C. 
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Patchak to avoid the carefully crafted provisions of the QTA deemed 
necessary for the protection of the national public interest and interests 
of American Indian Tribes.
142
  
                                           
142
 See supra Part IV.B. 
